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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
have indicated her belief that some rights or interest still remained
in the vendee even after declaration of forfeiture. It is more likely,
however, that the quitclaim deed was taken in order to increase the
marketability of Palmer's title by destroying any possible cloud which
the vendee's interest would create. In that case any inconsistency in
conduct would obviously disappear as would the above possibility of
relief from forfeiture.
Conceivably a third rationalization may be founded on the theory
that the declaration of forfeiture was more closely analogous to a
mutual rescission. This conclusion would result if the declaration of
forfeiture were converted into an acceptance of the vendee's offer to
rescind implied from his default. Even though Norlin accepted the
mortgage knowing that it was subject to the vulnerability of a forfeit-
able contract, the fact that Palmer took an assignment of the vendor's
interest with notice of the mortgage could result in her having less
freedom to declare a forfeiture than the original vendor had. The
element of wilfulness in the vendee's ability to destroy the security for
the mortgage by defaulting in payment of installments, combined with
the voluntary exercise of Palmer's option to declare a forfeiture on
default, could have been considered so unfair that an equity court was
unwilling to recognize the strict forfeiture as between Norlin and
Palmer.
Balancing all the equities and considerations discussed above it is
at least arguable that relief from strict forfeiture should not have
resulted from the court's decree recognizing the survival of the mort-
gage as a lien. The complete absence of judicial discussion of the for-
feiture issue directs the conclusion that the result should at least be
re-examined when the opportunity next arises. HARTLEY PAUL
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
County-imposed Real Estate Sales Tax-Applicability to Corpor-
ate Transfers in Dissolution. Extending the reasoning in Deer Park
Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County,1 Doric Co. v. King County2 holds
that a distribution of a dissolved corporation's sole asset to its sole
shareholder, who does not assume an existing debt of the corporation,
146 Wn.2d 852, 286 P2d 98 (1955).
2 57 Wn.2d 640, 358 P2d 972 (1961).
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is not a sale within the meaning of RCW 28.45.050, which authorizes
counties to levy a tax on the sale of real estate.3
The plaintiff corporation instituted voluntary dissolution proceedings
and a trustee was appointed according to law.' The only corporate
asset was an apartment building, valued at $5,100,000 and encumbered
by a mortgage securing an installment note with an outstanding balance
of about $2,350,000. The trustee executed a warranty deed, conveying
all of the corporation's interest in the apartment house to the sole
shareholder. The deed stated that the property was conveyed subject
to the lien; the shareholder did not assume the obligation secured by
the mortgage. Subsequent to the distribution plaintiff paid all install-
ments on the note as they came due out of the income from the
building. The plaintiff paid the county real estate sales tax of one
per cent of the obligation owing on the note under protest and brought
an action for refund. The trial court entered summary judgment dis-
missing the suit.
The county real estate sales tax is not a tax upon property itself,
but rather an excise upon the sale of property.5 An excise tax could
be levied upon any conveyance of property, even by gift,' but the
statutes purport to authorize a tax only upon the sale of real property
within the levying county.7 The term "sale" is defined to "have its
ordinary meaning and . . . [to] include any conveyance . . . or
transfer of the ownership of or title to real property . . . or any
estate or interest therein for a valuable consideration .... "s A lengthy
list of exceptions then follows. Determining what constitutes a con-
veyance of an interest in real property for valuable consideration, the
problem considered by the court in the Doric case, has been a prime
problem in administering the tax.
This county-imposed (although state-authorized) real estate sales
tax should not be confused with the state documentary stamp tax
imposed by RCW chapter 82.20. The stamp tax is an excise tax on
conveyancing instruments levied "upon . . . any . . . writing . . .
3 "The county commissioners of any county are authorized by ordinance to levy an
excise tax upon sales of real estate not exceeding one per cent of the selling price."
All Washington counties have implemented the tax. 1 CCH WAsla. TAx REP. fr 56,542.
4 RCW 23.01.530.
5 Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wn.2d 405, 243 P.2d 627 (1952) (construing the tax as
being upon one of the incidents of ownership).
6 Id. at 408, 243 P.2d at 628-29. The court quoted extensively from Bromley v.
McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136-38 (1929). See also Sablosky v. Messner, 372 Pa. 47,
92 A.2d 411 (1952).
7 RCW 28.45.050, .060.
8 RCW 28.45.010.
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whereby any . . . realty sold shall be . . . conveyed to, or vested in,
the purchaser . . . when the consideration or value of the interest . . .
conveyed . . . exceeds one hundred dollars."9 The term "realty sold"
is not defined by this statute. This excise is very similar to the county
tax; generally both will apply to the same transaction. The county
tax is levied at the rate of one per cent of the consideration or selling
price, while the state tax is roughly one-tenth of one per cent of the
consideration."0
The applicability of the county tax to a corporate dissolution was
first litigated in Deer Park Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County." Two
corporations owned all of the stock in a third corporation, whose assets
included a considerable amount of timber land. The jointly-owned
corporation was dissolved and the trustee in dissolution distributed
the land to the shareholder corporations who assumed the dissolved
corporation's obligations. Stevens County sought to impose the tax
based on the market value of the property situated in the county. It
argued that: (1) to make the tax appropriate the only requirements
are a transfer of an interest in real property and consideration, (2) the
consideration here was the surrender and extinguishment of the rights
in the dissolved corporation represented by the stock, and (3) the
value of the stock surrendered was the value of the land so the tax
should be assessed on that value.' The taxpayer argued that a dis-
tribution pursuant to a corporate dissolution is not a sale within the
ordinary meaning of the word and thus should not be taxed. The
taxpayer made the alternative argument that if the conveyance was
made for valuable consideration, the only value given was the assump-
tion of the corporate liabilities by the distributees. Thus, the tax, if
imposed, should be measured by the amount of the liabilities assumed
rather than the total value of the property distributed.
A lengthy amici curiae brief was filed by a number of law firms, in
which it was argued that the dissolution distribution was not a con-
veyance for valuable consideration inasmuch as nothing given by the
distributees had been bargained for. It was further argued that be-
cause the distribution was in satisfaction of pre-existing rights of the
9 RCW 8220.010.
10The definition of consideration differs slightly. The county tax includes the
amount of a prior lien remaining after the sale, RCW 28.45.030, while the state tax
excludes this amount. Wash. Rev. Act, Rule 184 (rev. 1960).
146 Wn.2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
12 See Brief for Respondent.
1" See Brief for Appellant.
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shareholders, title vested in them automatically after certain unilateral
acts on the part of the corporation."4
The court concluded that "the science of semantics would be
stretched beyond permissible limits to conclude that the transaction
: . . constitute(d) a sale in 'its ordinary meaning,' "" but that still,
it might be a conveyance for a valuable consideration. However, the
shareholders' loss of their rights was not valuable consideration.
The fact that the dissolution of the corporation is the act which
terminates the right to participate in the management of the corpora-
ion, and makes operative the right to share in the distribution of
assets, does not make the termination of the first, the consideration
for the execution of the second. There is no conveyance for a valuable
consideration, taxable under the ordinance and statutes we are con-
sidering, where a change of title to real property is effected solely as a
result of its distribution to stockholders of a solvent corporation in the
process of dissolution, except as hereafter noted.16
Neither did the court consider the actual surrender of the stock cer-
tificates to be valuable consideration; "their surrender is, at this stage
of the proceeding, a matter of form and not of substance. The stock-
holder neither gained nor lost anything thereby.' 7
The court did determine, however, relying upon two federal cases"
interpreting the federal documentary stamp tax," that the voluntary
assumption of the corporation liabilities by the distributee stockholders
constituted giving valuable consideration, and that the tax was prop-
erly levied on the amount of the liabilities assumed. The underlying
theory is that the net equity of the corporation in the assets was
conveyed without consideration, but because the corporation's creditors
have first claim on the distributed assets,"0 the distributees' assumption
of the obligations is in effect a purchase of the creditor's interest.
However, if the conceptual approach to the transaction is that the
corporation can convey only its net equity in the property, then the
result becomes anomalous in that the tax is imposed upon what is not
14 See Brief for Amici Curiae.
15 Deer Park Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 NVn.2d 852, 855, 286 P.2nd
98, 100 (1955).
16 Id. at 857, 286 P2d at 100-01.
'.7Ibid.
"8Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 208 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1954) ; R. H. Macy &
Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19 "There is hereby imposed, on each deed, instrument, or writing by which any
lands, tenements, or other realty sold shall be granted ... or otherwise conveyed to...
any ... person... when the consideration or value of the interest ... conveyed.., exceeds
$100...." 26 U.S.C. § 4361 (1955).
20 Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913).
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conveyed, rather than what is conveyed. A further criticism concerns
the requirement that consideration be bargained for.2 It is difficult
to conceive that the assumption of debts is the inducement for the
conveyance in the corporate dissolution.
The taxpayer in the Doric case, no doubt with an eye to the Deer
Park decision, did not assume the debt of the corporation, but took the
asset subject to the security interest, thus removing this factor as
possible consideration for the conveyance. The county still sought
to impose the tax, arguing that where the asset is valued at more than
twice the amount of the debt secured, taking "subject to" is tantamount
to "assuming," so that the taxpayer implicitly assumed the obligation.'
Thus the county sought to apply the excise tax to all corporate dis-
solutions involving the distribution of real property which exceeds in
value the debts secured by it, whether any liabilities are actually as-
sumed or not. To this the court answered, "We disagree. . . .We
did not find that, as a matter of law, stockholders agree to assume
the corporate liabilities when they seek a voluntary dissolution of the
corporation."23 The court concluded that because there was no express
assumption of the corporate debts by the distributee shareholder, the
conveyance was not for valuable consideration, and thus no excise
tax should be imposed. The same reasoning should be applied to a
partial liquidation, for no substantial distinction exists. Florida has
taken this position.2'
Taken together, Doric and Deer Park have clear meaning for
corporate shareholders contemplating dissolution. If all corporate
obligations are satisfied prior to distribution, or if the distributees do
not assume them, there is no argument-no tax is assessable.
But there is little guidance for solving similar but not analagous
problems. Because the tax, though burdensome, rarely exceeds the
cost of trying and appealing a case, litigation seldom reaches the ap-
pellate level at which definitive answers are given. The language of
the statute, although becoming more explicit with each new amend-
ment, is still so broad that in many circumstances the taxpayer is
21 "Consideration must actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise."
RESTATEMNT, CONTRACTS § 75 comment b (1932). See also Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. DeLisle, 47 Wn.2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955) ; Snyder v. Roberts, 45 Wn.2d
865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).2 2 Brief for Respondent, pp. 2-10, 21-23, The Doric Co. v. King County, 57 Wn.2d
640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961).
23The Doric Co. v. King County, 57 Wn.2d 640, 645-46, 358 P.2d 972, 975 (1961).
24State ex rel. Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956). Contra,
Ops. A'r'y GEN. 490 (Wash. 1951-53) (rendered before either Deer Park or Doric).
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uncertain as to his obligations. For instance, if a taxpayer organizes
a corporation for the purpose of conveying his real property to it,
taking in return stock of that corporation, is this a "sale" within the
meaning of the statute and ordinances? What of a merger or con-
solidation of two corporations involving real property? These situa-
tions are not covered by the statute.
Opinions of the Washington Attorney General on the question of
what is a taxable sale are numerous. However, the Attorney General's
position as counsel for the State Tax Division, and the comparable
agencies of the counties, makes objectivity in interpreting the tax
statute difficult.25 Thus it appears that the prime purpose of these
opinions is not to give impartial interpretations of the law, but rather to
indicate the position of the State in a given situation. The taxpayer
then knows only that he must litigate if he is to establish his contention.
To predict the outcome of that litigation with any measure of reliability
the practitioner must look elsewhere.
The Washington State Tax Commission has promulgated rules re-
lating to the state documentary stamp tax. They do not necessarily
apply to the county real estate sales tax, because of differences in lan-
guage, but may be helpful by analogy. The state tax is phrased much
like the federal documentary stamp tax; therefore the Tax Commis-
sion has promulgated a rule that "in situations not specifically covered
by this rule, the Tax Commission will be guided by any covering
regulation of the United States Bureau of Internal Revenue relating
to federal documentary stamps."" In Deer Park the court indicates
that these regulations may also be applied to the county tax by its
statement that, "analogous to the (county) tax . . . is the Federal
documentary stamp tax . . .2" and by its reliance on federal cases
construing the federal tax.2" Further, because the state and the federal
tax statutes are worded similarly, the county tax apparently may be
analogized to the state tax.
2 5 Ops. AT'Y GEN. 98 (Wash. 1951-53), to the effect that deeds by which tenants
in common partition their land in accordance with their respective undivided interests
therein are taxable, was nullified by legislative amendment in 1955. Wash. Sess. Laws
1955, ch. 132, § 1. The Deer Park case similarly nullified the most recent opinion on
the subject. Ops. ATr'y GEN. 116 (Wash. 1953-55).2 6 Wash. Rev. Act, Rule 184 (rev. 1960). The comparable federal regulation may
be found at Treas. Reg. § 43.4361 (1961).
27 Deer Park Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 Wn.2d 852, 857, 286 P.2d 98,
101 (1955). This conclusion is open to attack, because the former is levied upon a sale
of realty (an act), while the latter is levied upon an instrument of conveyance (a
document). Hence, the incidents taxed are totally different, although the one may
normally accompany the other.
28 See note 18, supra.
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No other jurisdiction appears to have a statute phrased in the terms
of the county provision, but several have taxes similar to the federal
documentary stamp tax.29 Litigation interpreting these acts may be of
some assistance, but because of the uniformly low rates of these taxes,
appellate decisions are rare.
These sources, although limited, do yield some helpful information
regarding the problems previously alluded to: conveyance of property
to a corporation upon its organization by its sole owner"0 and corpora-
tion mergers or consolidations." Beyond this, one may only attempt
to develop some basic principles from the applicable Washington de-
cisions. An initial premise in Washington, and generally, in the
construction of any tax statute is that its provisions should not be
extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used,
and in cases of doubt the statute should be construed most strongly
20 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and District of Columbia.30 The Attorney General of Washington takes the position that a transfer of realty
to a corporation by the sole shareholder, the consideration returned being the issuance
of common stock, constitutes a sale. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 100 (Wash. 1959-60). This
follows a series of "precedents." See Ops. Arr'y GEN. 11 (Wash. 1957-58); Ops.
ArfY' GEN. 29 (Wash. 1955-57) ; OPs. Ar'Y GEN. 25 (Wash. 1955-57) (transfer by
a husband and wife under court order pursuant to a property settlement in a divorce
proceeding); OPs. Ar'Y GEN. 225 (Wash. 1953-55);Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 313 (Wash.
1951-53). The latest opinion does not, however, take the Doric case into consideration,
for although the opinion was issued two weeks after the Doric decision was rendered,
the court's opinion did not appear in advance sheet form until a week after the opinion
was issued.
The Federal Regulation states that a conveyance to a corporation in return for its
stock is taxable, Treas. Reg. § 43.4361-2 (a) (7) (1961), but does not cover the "sole
shareholder upon organization problem." One federal case has held such a transfer not
taxable. Murray v. Hoey, 32 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (the taxpayer was a
non-stock corporation). Connecticut has held that such a transfer of personal property
is a sale under a sales and use tax. Frank Amodio Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v.
Connelly, 144 Conn. 569, 135 A.2d 737 (1957).
It was decided in Deer Park that when a corporation is dissolved, the termination of
the rights incident to the ownership of stock was not "consideration" for the right to
direct ownership of the asset by distribution. (See text accompanying note 16, .supra.)
The court may well determine, based upon this that the reverse procedure should be
treated in the same fashion: that is, that the termination of direct ownership in an
asset is not "consideration" for the rights incident to the ownership of stock received
by the individual, and thus that no taxable "sale" occurred.
It would seem, however, that an organizer could build a stronger case for himself by
paying cash for a few shares of stock; then conveying the realty to the corporation,
taking nothing in return. He would still have sole ownership of the asset, through
the corporation, but it would be extremely difficult to find consideration for the
conveyance.31 The universal feeling seems to be that a corporate merger or consolidation does
not involve a conveyance of property for consideration. Ops. AxriY GEN. 158 (Wash.
1951-53); Treas. Reg. § 43.4361-2 (b) (12). Courts generally agree. United States
v. Seattle-First National Bank, 321 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1944); United States v.
Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 53 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ; Rochelle Inv. Corp.
v. Fontenot, 34 F. Supp. 118 (D. La. 1940) ; National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Carpen-
ter, 326 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1959) (under personal property sales and use tax).
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against the government and in favor of the citizen.32 A second basic
principle is that a political subdivision has no inherent power to levy
taxes, and thus cannot exceed the power delegated to it by the state.33
Thus the counties of the state can never go beyond the statutory
framework of RCW chapter 28.45.
The county real estate excise tax is dependent on (1) a conveyance
(2) for valuable consideration."4 Neither Doric nor Deer Park specifi-
cally hold that a conveyance occurs when a corporation is dissolved.
In both the court assumed this premise. It may not, however, be so
clear. Dissolution itself is a volitional act, but the transfer of the
property interest automatically results.
On dissolution, the legal title to land passes to the stockholders, and
title to the corporate property vests in the stockholders as tenants in
common and is subject to their contract if all debts have been paid and
no receiver has been appointed. The sole stockholder in a dissolved
corporation has such an interest in its property as may pass by will.-;
This argument was made (although not very articulately) to the court
by the amici curiae in the Deer Park case, 6 but apparently without
persuasive effect.
As has been seen, the Washington cases establish that the surrender
of stock certificates, or loss of the rights of stock ownership in a dissolu-
tion process, are not "valuable consideration." It should be noticed,
however, that either surrender of certificates or loss of rights would
constitute sufficient consideration in the contract sense to make a
counter promise enforceable." Hence, it appears that the court will
require something more than the traditional "pepper-corn." The con-
32Thys v. State, 31 Wn.2d 739, 199 P2d 68 (1948) ; Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn.2d 347, 178 P2d 351 (1947); State v. Lawton, 25
Wn2d 750, 172 P2d 465 (1946) ; State v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 195 Wash. 244
80 P.2d 780 (1938) ; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 46, 53 P,2d
308 (1936) ; Denny v. Wooster, 175 Wash. 272, 27 P.2d 328 (1933) ; Union Trust Co.
v. Spokane County, 145 Wash. 193, 259 Pac. 9 (1927).
33 Great No. R.R. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash. 238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919). See also
Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn.2d 347, 178 P.2d 351(1947) (and cases cited therein) ; State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter, 190 Wash. 703, 70
P.2d 1056 (1937) (and cases cited therein).
34 Required also under the federal documentary tax. See Treas. Reg. § 43.4361-1(a) (4) (ii).
3 16 FLETcHEa, CORPORATIONS § 8134 at p. 878 (1942). See also Cohen v. L. & G.
Inv. Co., 186 Wash. 308, 57 P.2d 1042 (1936); Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75
Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913).
36 Brief of Amici Curiae, pp. 14-15, Deer Park Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County,
46 Wn.2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
3
7RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 75 (1932).
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cept of valuable consideration is often used in a conveyancing context
to determine whether one taking a conveyance without notice of an
outstanding interest will be protected by a recording statute. In this
context it has been explained thus:
Although there is authority to the contrary, generally the term "valu-
able consideration" is used in contradistinction to a good, valid, or
sufficient consideration. The term means something of substantial
value, such as money, or something that is worth money, as, for
example, legal or other services. Moreover, to constitute a considera-
tion the thing of value which is given must be in respect of the contract
of saleA8
At least one other jurisdiction has required such consideration under
a comparable statute: "actual monetary consideration or . . .consid-
erations which have a reasonably determinable pecuniary value."3
If the county taxing authorities cannot be convinced of the justice
of one's position on the basis of the sources and principles above dis-
cussed, then the taxpayer must become reconciled to payment of the
tax although convinced that it is unjustly levied, unless he is prepared
to sacrifice for the sake of principle. Only in rare instances, such as
the Doric case, are sufficient amounts involved as to make an eventual
victory worth the cost of the battle.
GORDON G. CONGER
3s 92 CJ.S. Vendor & Purcluser § 323 at p. 225 (1955). See also 55 Am. Jim.
VJttdor & Purchaser § 736 (1946) ; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 632, 636 (1929).3ODeVore v. Gay, 39 So. 2d 796, 797 (Fla. 1949) (holding that promises to pay
rent in the future and perform other covenants were not valuable consideration).
TORTS
Evidence of Lack of Malice by Defendant to Mitigate Damages
in Defamation Action. Prior to the appearance of Farrar v. Tribune
Publishing Co.,1 it appeared reasonably clear that in defamation
actions,2 evidence of the defendant's malice or good faith was not
admissible for the purpose of enhancing or mitigating damages. Since
I For a survey of the law of libel in Washington see Comment, 30 WAsH. L. REv.
36 (1955).
257 Wn.2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961).
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